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The real world is messy in all sorts of ways.  Those who try to model the 
world, whether as scientists trying to explain it or as moralists trying to 
change it, attempt to abstract from that messiness.  They seek models that are 
simpler, cleaner, more transparent than the reality that those models are 
attempting to mirror.1   
 Newtonian physics envisages balls colliding on a frictionless plane.  Of 
course, when Fast Eddy shoots pool on a real table, he had better remember 
about friction.  But starting with an idealized Newtonian model and then 
factoring in friction serves as a pretty good guide.   
 Something analogous is generally supposed to be true when it comes 
to moral philosophy.  In terminology owing to Rawls (capturing an idea that 
is much older) moral philosophers distinguish between "ideal theory" and 
"non-ideal theory."2  They accept the need to make adaptations to ideal theory 
when applying it to the real world, of course, adjusting for the ways in which 
the actual differs from the ideal.3  But it is generally assumed that making 
those sorts of adjustments will be no more problematic for moral 
philosophers than it is for Fast Eddy hunched over the green felt.   
                                                 
1 Black 1962. 
2 Rawls 1971, pp. 245 ff.  Sreenivasan infra.  Simmons 2010.  For an excellent application to 
another realm, that of international migration and global justice, see Carens (1996). 
3 Of course, Rawls does not abstract from absolutely all non-ideal aspects of the actual world. 
He does not abstract from the sad fact of material scarcity for example: if everyone 
could have as much as they wanted and questions of distributive justice would not 
arise (Rawls 1971, sec. 22, pp. 126-30).  What grounds there are from abstracting out 
some non-ideal facts but not others for purposes of moral theory is a large topic, too 
little discussed.  But I simply note it here in passing. 
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 Starting with the ideal may indeed be ideal, in all sorts of ways.4   But 
in one important respect it might be seriously in error.  It is wrong simply to 
assume – as moral philosophers typically do, without much elaboration or 
discussion – that, when it comes to applying their moral theories, starting 
from the ideal and tacking back to the real will be relatively straightforward.  
They dismiss all that with a cavalier "mutatis mutandis."  As this chapter will 
show, it is not that easy.   
 From basic economic theory we know that the second-best state of 
affairs might be very different indeed from the first-best.  Compensating 
variations in several dimensions might be – and typically are – required to 
make up for shortfalls in others.  Where that is so, the right thing to do in 
some non-ideal world cannot be simply and straightforwardly read off ideal 
theory's prescription of what to do under ideal circumstances.  
 After briefly cataloguing various different respects in which the real 
world might deviate from the that presupposed in ideal theorizing, I shall 
introduce the General Theory of Second-best and explain the trouble it makes 
for reading real-world prescriptions directly off ideal-theory 
pronouncements.  The upshot of that discussion is that it adjusting our (ideal) 
theory to the (real, messy) world may be genuinely problematic.  
Alternatively, we might try instead to adjust our (real, messy) world so that it 
better fits the conditions presupposed by ideal theory.  If we succeeded 
                                                 
4 Ideal theory, Rawls (1971, pp. 8-9; 391) says, is the more "fundamental." We need it to tell us 
what we should be aiming at through social reform of non-ideal circumstances 
(Rawls 1971, pp. 8-9, 245; 1993, p. 285; 2001, p. 13).  
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completely in that, then the prescriptions of ideal theory would be directly 
applicable, without the sort of adjustments that the Theory of Second-best 
makes so fraught; but unless we can completely instantiate all the conditions 
presupposed by ideal theory, we might still fall afoul the Theory of Second-
best.  Yet another response to the problems posed by the General Theory of 
Second-best would be to abandon the quest for excessively idealized moral 
theories, and instead to theorize the world in the vicinity of where we 
actually find ourselves.  Depending upon the empirical facts of the matter, 
any of those strategies might work.  And any of them might, again depending 
on empirical facts of the matter, be usefully supplemented by a pair of partial 
solutions, decomposing problems or making policy choices that are relatively 
robust across changing circumstances.  In the end, however, there is no sure 
solution to the problems posed by the Theory of Second-best – only a suite of 
more or less imperfect alternatives. 
 
 
I.  Why Second Best? 
 
The need for “second-best” solutions arises because “first-best” solutions are 
unavailable.  Moral philosophers mark this as a contrast between “ideal” and 
“non-ideal theory," and it is that moral usage with which this chapter is 
concerned.  (There may be various other non-moralized senses in which a 
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state of affairs can be non-ideal.  My focus here, however, is on deviations 
from the ideal that are problematic in a more principled way.5) 
 At a minimum, we can say that state of affairs is morally non-ideal if 
resources are inadequate to meet morally obligatory tasks.6  This shortfall 
might occur in any (or several or all) of the following dimensions: 
1)  Material resources might not be adequate.  Morally, we ought to prevent 
all preventable deaths, let us suppose.  But given available technology, 
we simply cannot manufacture enough vaccine in time.  Or if health 
dollars are strictly limited, we might decide to settle for a second-best 
procedure that is "much cheaper and almost as good" for treating one 
condition, in order to free up health dollars to treat some other 
condition.7  Or poor country that relies on foreign donors with short time 
horizons might opt for a narrowly targeted health intervention that 
shows quick results rather than investing in more comprehensive 
primary health care infrastructure:  the latter would be better, but the 
foreign funds would not be available for it.8 
                                                 
5 Whereas Hume and Rawls (1971, pp. 126 ff.) following him would define the 
“circumstances of justice” in terms of scarcity of resources relative to desires, I shall 
define what's morally “ideal” or “non-ideal” relative to moral rights and duties.   
6 I am uncertain how to incorporate imperfect duties and supererogation here.  Maybe it 
morally matters that people have enough resources to perform some of those acts 
too, and a state of affairs is also morally non-ideal insofar as they do not. 
7 The possibility might be more theoretical than real, judging from the scarcity of reports of 
such "decrementally cost-effective medical innovations" in the published literature. 
A survey of medical cost-utility analyses published between 2002 and 2007 found 
that only 9 of the 2128 interventions described were $ 100,000 or more cheaper than 
the existing standard of care per Quality Adjusted Life Year sacrificed (Nelson et al. 
2009).  It is an open question whether this result is due to a genuine paucity of 
"much cheaper and almost as good" interventions or whether it is merely an artifact 
of publication practices. 
8 Msuya 2003, p. 17. 
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2)  Ideational resources might not be adequate.  We might have inadequate or 
even erroneous understanding, either normatively (of True Morality) or 
empirically (of how the world works).  We might not know how to make 
a vaccine.  Or we might not understand why morally we should make 
and distribute it widely, even if we could. 
3)  Institutional resources might not be adequate.   Morally, let us suppose, 
we ought to harvest organs from willing donors immediately upon 
"death" and transplant them promptly into the most appropriate 
recipients.  But in the absence of institutional arrangements for wide-scale 
tissue-matching and priority-setting, we often end up giving the organ to 
someone who, while appropriate, is almost certainly not the most 
appropriate.9 
4)  Motivational resources might not be adequate.10  Morally, we ought to 
allocate scarce medical resources to the people who need them most 
badly.  But we just cannot bring ourselves to give the last available dose 
of vaccine to some stranger who is at greater risk rather than giving it to 
our own child, or to send scarce vaccine to people who are at greater risk 
abroad rather than allocating it to our fellow countryfolk. 
5)  Coordination resources might not be adequate.   Morally, we ought to 
prevent the spread of life-threatening diseases, let us suppose.   But even 
                                                 
9 Healey 2000; 2006.  I employ scare quotes, because brain-dead patients are in other 
important senses not really dead:  indeed, dead organs can save no one's life.  
10 This the case most often discussed in the philosophical literature, by Rawls (1971, p. 8, 254, 
351) when he defines “ideal theory” in terms of “strict compliance” and by others 
who talk of the “demandingness” of morality (Murphy 2000; Mulgan 2001; cf. 
Goodin 2009). 
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though the requisite motivational, material, ideational and institutional 
resources are all in place for doing so, we might still be thwarted by a 
failure to coordinate our well-meaning efforts.  The correct sequencing of 
pharmacological, psychological and social interventions is crucial, let us 
suppose; different people necessarily have to be responsible for each; and 
coordinating their concerted action is beyond our powers.11 
 The source of the shortfalls that make a situation less than ideal might 
be in our own resources or in the resources of others.  Thus, for example, we 
may be unable to inoculate everyone in time because of a lack of material 
resources to manufacture enough vaccine ourselves on our part, or on the 
part of others (e.g. foreign manufacturers).  Or the reason we are unable to 
get the vaccine to those most in need might have to do with a failure of other 
people's motivations rather than our own (we declined to give the last dose of 
vaccine to our own child, only to watch someone else appropriate it for her 
own child who was not particularly needy, either).  And so on. 
 In terms of responses, it is an open question what morally we ought to 
do when we find ourselves in situations where resources are inadequate in 
any of these ways to meet morally obligatory tasks.  One alternative would be 
to take the world as we find it and do the best we can in those (admittedly, 
non-ideal) circumstances.  Another alternative would be to try to transform 
the situation – make the non-ideal circumstances more nearly ideal, wherever 
                                                 
11 Often, but perhaps not always, institutional arrangements are the solution to such problems 
– in which case the fourth case collapses into the second. 
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we can.   Both strategies risk falling systematically afoul of the General 
Theory of Second-best, as I shall go on to argue in Section III. 
  
 
II. Second-best Might Be Completely Different 
 
Whether or not we should "settle for less than the best" often provokes heated 
disputes – and rightly so.  (I shall say more of that shortly.) What is involved 
in settling for second-best is, in contrast, typically taken to be relatively 
straightforward.12  Wrongly so, I now want to argue.   
 Second-best solutions can, and often do, display peculiar features that 
pose particular challenges of institutional design and policy choice.  While 
these are nowise unique to bioethics, neither is bioethics in any way immune 
to them. 
  
 A.  The General Theory of the Second-best 
 
Long ago, economists Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster proved the 
General Theory of Second Best.   Put into what passes among economists as 
plain English:  “The general theorem of the second best states that if one of 
the conditions [characterizing the optimal outcome] cannot be fulfilled a 
                                                 
12 Or third-best, if what would be second-best is also unattainable, and so on:  those further 
iterations will become important in my discussion below; but for now let me speak 
as if “second-best” embraced all those non-first-best possibilities. 
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second best ... situation is achieved only by departing from all other optimum 
conditions.”13   
 Lipsey and Lancaster's formal proof is tied to specifics of the standard 
economistic set-up (well-ordered preferences, general equilibrium, and so 
on).  And their very strong conclusion ("only by") derives from some of the 
very particular stipulations that economists conventionally make concerning 
preference functions.   
 There is, however, a weaker – and more genuinely general – version of 
the Theory of Second Best that is independent of any such assumptions.  In 
that weaker and more general form which will be my focus in this chapter, 
the Theory of Second Best says this:  if the first-best state of affairs cannot be 
obtained, the second-best state of affairs is not necessarily identical to the 
first-best in any respect.  Whereas Lipsey and Lancaster's stronger version 
would say "necessarily not," the weaker and more general version that I shall 
be discussing says merely "not necessarily."   
 The phenomenon is a familiar one across broad swathes of life, once 
you come to think about it.  Here is one homely example.  Suppose that my 
first-best car has three attributes:  it is a (1) new (2) silver (3) Rolls Royce.  But 
                                                 
13 Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, p. 12 elaborate:  “The general theorem for the second best 
optimum states that if there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a 
constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other 
Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable.  In 
other words, given that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, 
then an optimum situation can be achieved only by departing from all the other 
Paretian conditions.  The optimum situation finally attained may be termed a 
second best optimum because it is achieved subject to a constraint which, by 
definition, prevents the attainment of a Paretian optimum. “ (Lipsey and Lancaster 
1956, p. 11). 
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suppose that there is no such car available at the moment, and for some 
reason I really must acquire a car immediately.  Hence I have to settle for 
second-best.  The Theory of Second Best cautions me that my second-best car 
will not necessarily be one that displays more rather than fewer of those same 
attributes as my first-best car.  Thus, for example, the second-best from my 
point of view would probably be a (1) week-old (2) black (3) Jaguar rather 
than a (1) new (2) silver (3) Toyota, if those were the only two cars on offer.  
That is true, even though the Jaguar displays none of the same features as my 
first-best car, and even though the Toyota displays two out of the three.  That 
is precisely the point of the Theory of Second Best. 
 Avishai Margalit offers another example, this one drawn from the 
teachings of the Church of Rome: 
 
The Catholic Church believes that being a nun is the ideal life.  It is the 
life of perfection for women.  The Catholic Church also believes that 
the sacrifice entailed in giving up sexuality and motherhood is such 
that most women cannot attain the ideal of becoming nuns.  The 
second best for a woman is not to become a nun with a lax attitude 
toward the prohibition of sexuality, but instead to become a mother.14 
 
 Similar examples pervade the public sphere as well.   Imagine a health 
promotion campaign.  Were we promoting a healthy lifestyle, what 
characteristics would that have?  The first-best lifestyle would (let us imagine) 
include at least the following attributes:  (1) no tobacco, (2) little alcohol and 
(3) regular exercise.   However, nobody would seriously think that the 
second-best lifestyle would be one that displayed perfectly two out of those 
                                                 
14 Margalit 2010, p. 116. 
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same three attributes without any regard to the other.  The second-best 
lifestyle would definitely not be one in which you neither smoke nor drink 
but never get any exercise at all, either. 
 The same phenomenon also recurs when implementing social ideals 
ore broadly.  The best society, let us imagine, is one that is both (1) free and 
(2) equal.  But suppose the only way to maintain perfect equality is to 
interfere with people's freedom in some respect (e.g., with their freedom to 
bequeath large sums of money to their heirs).   While the first-best society is, 
ex hypothesi, one that maximizes freedom and maximizes equality, the 
second-best society is probably not one that maximizes completely either of 
those values, regardless of the cost to the other.  Instead, the second-best 
society is probably one that scores pretty highly on both freedom and 
equality without literally maximizing either (e.g., imposing confiscatory taxes 
on bequests, but only above a certain sum). 
 That thought is sometimes expressed in terms of “value trade-offs."15  
Of course, there may be some values you refuse ever to trade off for any 
others.  Maybe some values stand in a strict hierarchical relation to others, 
such that any difference (no matter how small) on the top-ranked value 
trumps for you any difference (no matter how large) on the lower-ranked 
value.  Much more typically, however, you would probably be prepared to 
                                                 
15 As in the title of Arthur Okun's book, Equality and Efficiency:  The Big Tradeoff (1975). 
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give up a little bit of value-attainment in one dimension in exchange for a 
certain amount in the other.16 
 When the choice situation forces us to trade off one value for another, 
we have to decide which matters more (and by how much) in that situation.  
In such cases, worries can arise concerning the commensurability of values.    
Can they really be compared, in ways that would allow us coherently to trade 
more of one for less of the other?   
 Sometimes, however, choosing among options does not require any 
invidious comparisons across values.  All the comparisons can sometimes be 
done within the same value.  Cass Sunstein offers various examples of that 
sort in his discussion of “Health-health Trade-offs” that arise in risk 
regulation. For example, "Regulations designed to control the spread of AIDS 
and hepatitis among health care providers may increase the costs of health 
care, and thus make health care less widely available, and thus cost lives...  A 
ban on carciongens in food additives may lead consumers to use 
noncarcinogenic products that carry greater risks in terms of diseases other 
than cancer."17   
 Note that what you regard as second-best will always depend on the 
interaction between your evaluative standards (preferences, values) and your 
options (the feasible set over which you can effectively choose).  But note 
well:  it is not as if you change your standards when confronted with new 
                                                 
16 Barry 1965, pp. 4-8; cf. Rawls 1971, pp. 34-45. 
17 Sunstein 1996, pp. 1535-6. 
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options.  The same standards apply.  They simply apply differently over a 
different feasible set. 
 Note too that the Theory of Second-best applies only to multiple-
attribute decision problems.  If there is only one criterion (or if there are 
multiple criteria that are hierarchically ranked in a lexical order, such that 
only one is in play at any given time), then it is necessarily the case that what 
is second-best will be whatever is as similar possible to what is first-best on 
that only or lexically-prior criterion. 
There are two factors driving the Second-Best phenomenon.  One is 
"suboptimization."  That is the error of optimizing on only a subset of all the 
dimensions that are actually important to you.  In so doing, you get the right 
result with respect to that subset of dimensions to which you are paying 
attention– but the wrong result with respect to the other dimensions that you 
are ignoring in the process.  That is how you end up choosing the new silver 
Toyota – by fixating on two criteria that matter to you but ignoring the third 
(that you want a luxury car, not merely a new black one). Typically, the right 
thing to do all-things-considered differs from the right thing to do only some-
things-considered.  
The second factor driving the Second-Best phenomenon is "interaction" 
across those dimensions.  So, for example, education interacts with health 
which interacts with employment:  the more education people have the better 
able they are to make healthy lifestyle choices and the better able they are to 
take advantage of employment opportunities; and the healthier people are 
the better able they are to hold down a job.  That is why policymakers need to 
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consider the entire suite of education-health-employment policies all together 
in a holistic manner, rather than just attending to them separately.18 
 
 
III.  Strategies for Bridging the Ideal-Real Gap 
 
With the Theory of Second-best firmly in view, let me now return to show 
what trouble might makes for moral philosophers trying to apply their "ideal 
theories" to the real world.  
 
 
 A. Make the Theory Fit the World  
 
Standard practice, as I have said, is for moral philosophers to develop their 
theories of what should be done in "ideal" conditions, abstracting from 
various messy features found in the real world.  When they come to apply 
those theories to the real world, they then simply make such adjustments to 
ideal theory's prescriptions as are required in light of those non-ideal facts 
about the real world.   
 Sometimes those are modest tweaks.  Other times they are major bolt-
ons.  For an example of the latter, notice that in the world of ideal theory no 
                                                 
18 As Prince Edward Island tried to do, with little success, by giving a single regional 
authority responsibility for reallocating resources across a broad range of health and 
community services (Stoddart et al. 2006). 
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one would ever break the law and no government would enact an unjust law. 
Both things sometimes happen in the real world, however. To accommodate 
that fact, Rawls needed to bolt a theory of corrective justice and a theory of 
civil disobedience onto his theory of justice when applying it to the non-ideal 
real world.19 
 Even when whole new branches have to be added to ideal theory in 
applying it to the real world, however, writers like Rawls tend to presume 
that the basic structure set by ideal theory remains unchanged.  Adjustments 
will inevitably be required at the margins, and extra bits will have to be 
added on the edges.  But, writers like Rawls assume, the great bulk of ideal 
theory's prescriptions will remain the same as applied to the real world.20   
 Furthermore, however far in the background, this assumption is not 
just some incidental oversight.  It goes to the heart of the methodology.  If 
systematic, thoroughgoing revisions to ideal theory's prescriptions would be 
regularly required in applying it to any real-world situation, then there 
would be no point in starting with ideal theory.  If tacking back to the real 
world requires us to rethink everything afresh, then it is not at all clear what 
ideal theorizing has bought us.   
                                                 
19 Rawls 1971, pp. 8-9, 245-6, 575.   
20 True, Rawls offers what Simmons (2010, pp. 24) calls an "integrated ideal."  But while the 
ideal itself is integrated, the procedure Rawls suggests for pursuit of that ideal in 
the non--ideal world is not.  Simmons thinks otherwise.  He (and he thinks Rawls) 
appreciates that "our attacks on particular, especially offensive injustices may be... 
understandably compelling."  Yet he (and he thinks Rawls) suppose that "few 
devotees of 'partial justice' would be able to sustain their single-minded 
commitments in the face of clear evidence that their efforts were setting back or 
permanently blocking movement toward overall social justice."  Yet a "one injustice 
at a time" approach is precisely what Rawls (2001, p. 13) seems to recommend, in 
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 The Theory of Second-best, however, warns that that may be precisely 
what is required.  There is no reason to think that the second-best (i.e., non-
ideal) world is necessarily identical to the first-best (i.e., ideal) world in nearly 
every respect.  There is no reason necessarily to think that most (or indeed 
any, much less most) of ideal theory's prescriptions will carry over 
unchanged (or even just minimally changed) in a world that is less than ideal 
in any respect.   
 So the Theory of Second-best stands in the way of any assumption that 
what is second-best can necessarily be read easily and straightforwardly off 
ideal theory's description of what is first-best.  In adapting ideal theory to a 
non-ideal world, systematic root-and-branch changes might be required to 
ideal theory's prescriptions. 
 Or they might not.  All that my weaker and more general version of 
the Theory of Second-best says is that the second-best does not necessarily 
bear any close resemblance to the first best, not that it necessarily does not.  
Whether it does or not depends just on boring empirical facts of the matter – 
facts to do largely with interactions across the evaluative domains and the 
centrality of any given evaluative criterion to the situation under 
consideration.  This is what creates possibilities for more or less successfully 
"decomposing problems" in ways I shall discuss shortly. 
  The Theory of Second-best is thus better understood as cautionary 
rather than condemnatory.  It does not say that the standard approach of first 
                                                                                                                                           
saying that "ideal theory... should ... help to clarify the goal of reform and to identify 
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producing an ideal theory and then assuming that the right prescriptions real 
world are pretty much the same is necessarily wrong, always and 
everywhere.  There might be some circumstances in which that would work 
fine.  All the Theory of Second-best, in its weaker and more general form, 
says is that we must not assume that that is always the case.  We must 
proceed with caution, and we must be prepared for that procedure 
sometimes to fail badly. 
 
 
 B. Make the Real World More Nearly Ideal 
 
The standard strategy is to start from ideal theory and adjust it to fit the real 
world.  The Theory of Second-best tells us that there may be real problems in 
doing so – that really major changes in ideal theory's prescriptions might be 
systematically required.  Might those problems be avoided by taking the 
opposite tack, making the real world more ideal in the ways to which the 
prescriptions of ideal theory are tailored? 
 There are many reasons, independently of difficulties posed by 
problems of identifying the second best, for wanting to make the real world 
more ideal.  Other things equal, it would be better if we were not lacking in 
the resources required to discharge our moral responsibilities.  And all the 
                                                                                                                                           
which wrongs are more grievous and hence more urgent to correct." 
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resources listed at the outset – material, ideational, institutional, motivational, 
coordination – can, in principle, be increased.  
 Just how hard or costly it will be to increase our moral resources is an 
open question, and one that is probably best answered differently for 
different classes of cases.  It may be easier to effect changes in your own 
institutions or your own motivations than those of others, for example.  That 
might suggest, in turn, that we ought to strive primarily to correct our own 
failings while by and large taking those of others as given.  Or for another 
example, it may be easier to change institutions than motivations:  that was 
Rousseau's thought in “taking men as they are and laws as they might be.”21   
 Conceptually, it is important to appreciate that feasibility always be 
understood dynamically.22  Writers like Bentham rightly bemoan the way in 
which “the plea of impossibility offers itself at every step, in justification of 
injustice in all its forms."23  It is the job of leaders, as Max Weber says at the 
end of his essay on “Politics as a Vocation," to make possible tomorrow what 
is not possible today.24  True, “ought implies can.”  But that does not excuse 
us from doing what we ought to do, merely because we cannot do it just at 
the moment.  If we can get ourselves into a position to do what we ought to 
do (in time still to do it), then that's what we ought to do, ceteris paribus. 
                                                 
21 Rousseau 1762.  For discussions of these options with special reference to global justice 
debates see:  Valentini 2009; Lawford-Smith 2010; and Ypi 2010. 
22 Gilabert 2009.  Simmons (2010, pp. 24-5) rightly emphasizes this, and supposes Rawls either 
does or should do similarly within the logic of his own theory. 
23 Bentham 1827, vol. 7, p. 285.  Goodin 1982, ch. 7. 
24 Weber 1919/2004, p. 9. 
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 Note that ceteris paribus clause well, however.  It is not necessarily the 
case that the best thing to do, all things considered, is to transform a non-
ideal situation into one that is morally ideal.  It is not, anyway, if the 
resources which would be expended to bring about that transformation could 
be used in morally more desirable ways.  In some non-ideal situations you 
can do almost as well as you could in the absolutely ideal one.  Then 
transforming the situation from non-ideal to ideal may well cost more than 
morally it is worth. 
 Nor is it the case that making real-world circumstances more like those 
presupposed by our ideal theory will necessarily make it easier to surmise 
from ideal theory what we should do in the real world.  It is not, anyway, if 
we do not succeed in instantiating all of the conditions presupposed by ideal 
theory.  Only if we did could we be sure that the prescriptions of ideal theory 
are precisely right for us in the world that we actually occupy.  If any one of 
the conditions presupposed by ideal theory is missing, then the Theory of 
Second-best warns that we might (not necessarily will, but might) need to 
make systematic alterations right across the board in the prescriptions of ideal 
theory.25  Again, if ideal theory's prescriptions were themselves 
decomposible, and if we could make real-world circumstances completely 
ideal in every respect relevant to any given prescription, then in that very 
                                                 
25 There is, furthermore, an bootstrapping issue here:  if we are in a non-ideal world and we 
want to make it ideal, how do we know how to do that?  We cannot (necessarily, 
anyway) use ideal theory to guide us how to get to the ideal, because ex hypothesi 
we are not in the ideal state yet; and the Theory of Second-best tells us that what is 
the right thing to do in the ideal state might be very different from the right thing to 
do in non-ideal states. 
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special case we could know with confidence what to do judging just from 




  C.  Theorize the Vicinity of the Actual 
 
If the Theory of Second-best stands in the way both of fitting ideal theory to 
the real world and of fitting the real world to ideal theory, then perhaps we 
ought abandon ideal theory altogether.  That is to say, instead of abstracting 
from all the messiness of the real world and assuming circumstances that are 
much more ideal than the actual circumstances in which we find ourselves, 
maybe we should build our moral theories from the start around assumptions 
that are broadly true of the world we are actually in.26 
 Again, there is much to be said for this strategy, quite apart from any 
assistance it might provide in avoiding problems posed by the Theory of 
Second-best.  Perhaps the main thing to be said for theorizing the vicinity of 
the actual is that we test our moral theories against our moral intuitions.  
Those moral intuitions, in turn, have been formed around the standard sorts 
of cases commonly faced in ordinary life.  If we try to theorize a world too far 
                                                 
26 For critical discussion of this option see Simmons (2010, pp. 30 ff.). 
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from our lived experience, we have nothing reliable to test our theories 
against.27 
 While the strategy of theorizing in the vicinity of the actual is thus very 
tempting, there are also obvious problems with it.  For one, it is messy – 
complicated, confusing – to try to model everything at once, without 
abstracting anything away.  For another, theorizing that is tightly bound to 
existing circumstances may not give us much guidance as to the direction in 
which we should attempt to change those circumstances for the better, 
morally.  For yet another, theorizing in this mode may be highly unstable, 
prescribing very different things as circumstances change, perhaps even only 
slightly. 
 Beyond all that, however, would this strategy really solve the 
problems that the Theory of Second-best poses for moral theorizing?  It 
would, if our moral theory were crafted to the exact circumstances actually 
obtaining in the real world.  Then our moral theory's prescriptions would be 
precisely right for the circumstances in which we apply it.  But the Theory of 
Second-best warns us that, if the actual circumstances are different in any 
respect whatsoever from those presupposed by our moral theory, then that 
theory's prescriptions might need to be systematically altered.  And requiring 
that moral theorizing be perfectly tailored to actual circumstances, when 
circumstances are constantly changing, would have us constantly 
retheorizing – leaving us with little time for acting.  If for whatever reason 
                                                 
27 Goodin 1982, ch. 1. 
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circumstances change faster than our moral theories can, this strategy will 
offer us no certain protection against the problems posed by the Theory of 
Second-best. 
 One comforting thought (which may or may not actually be true) 
might be this.  Perhaps as a brute empirical fact of the matter the 
prescriptions of a moral theory would not change very much with small 
changes in circumstances.  If that is true, then a moral theory concocted for 
one set of circumstances would be pretty much valid anywhere in the near 
neighborhood of those circumstances.  If that is true as a matter of empirical 
fact, then a moral theory framed around our actual circumstances will 
provide pretty good guidance anywhere in the vicinity of our currently-
actual circumstances.  (And by the same token, a moral theory framed around 
ideal assumptions will provide pretty good guidance anywhere in close 
vicinity to the circumstances presupposed by that ideal theory.28)  If that is 
how things empirically turned out, then well and good.  But again, that is a 
purely contingent empirical matter, and it could of course turn out otherwise.   
 
 
IV.  A Partial Solution:  Decomposing Problems 
 
                                                 
28 Rawls's (1971, p. 351) talk of "a state of near justice" suggests that that might have been 
what he was thinking, when assuming that his theory of civil disobedience could be 
bolted onto his theory of justice without altering much else in that larger theory. 
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The three grand solutions for coping with the problems posed by the Theory 
of Second-best all thus fail, or anyway may well fail.  Let us now turn to a 
pair of more partial solutions that might work in a more limited way.  Both 
turn out also to be vulnerable to threats from the Theory of Second-best, each 
in its own way. 
 Public policy-makers commonly try to decompose complex problems 
into their component parts, assigning responsibility for solving each 
component to separate actors.  That might be a particular sector of society 
(the family unit), a particular government department (Health or Education 
or Employment), a particular country (the one in which the victim happens to 
live).   In so doing, policy-makers are hoping that what is the best decision 
within each part, taken one-at-a-time, will when aggregated be best overall.    
 The basic idea obviously long predates him, but it is to Herbert Simon 
that we owe the modern formal concept of a "(nearly) decomposable system."  
Such a system is in his terms characterized by a high degree of modularity.  
That is to say, interactions occur (almost) wholly within modules, with 
(almost) none occurring across modules.29 
 Some problems lend themselves to that sort of a solution.  Others do 
not.  It all just depends on whether we can carve up the problem into (largely) 
self-contained parts, and assign each part to a (largely) self-contained module.  
If no matter how we carve up the problem, different parts will interact too 
                                                 
29 Simon 1969; 2002a, b. 
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much with other parts, then trying to divide up responsibility for the problem 
among (largely) self-contained units will not yield a good solution. 
 The Theory of Second-best however warns us that problems are not 
necessarily decomposable in the way that that approach requires.  If 
something goes wrong in one dimension, then adjustments will typically be 
required in all other dimensions.  Assigning responsibility for each dimension 
to different agents acting largely in isolation from one another precludes 
across-the-board adjustments. 
 Phrasing the point in economic terms, Lipsey and Lancaster write:  "It 
should be obvious ... that the principles of the general theory of second best 
shows the futility of 'piecemeal welfare economics.'  To apply to only a small 
part of an economy the welfare rules which would lead to a Paretian 
optimum if they were applied everywhere, may move the economy away 
from, not toward, a second best optimum position."30 
 Of course, we wish it were otherwise.  Nearly-decomposable systems 
would be quite convenient.  They allow us to take advantage of specialization 
and of the division of labour.  They admit of easy repair, replacing one 
malfunctioning module with another without any interruption to any other 
part of the system.  Nearly-decomposable systems evolve and adapt more 
quickly to changing circumstances, and hence enjoy an evolutionary 
                                                 
30 Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, p. 17. 
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advantage.31  So well may we wish that we were able to solve all our 
problems in that way. 
 But wishing does not make it so.  Decomposable solutions presuppose 
decomposable problems.  And where the second-best is radically different in 
many dimensions from the first-best, devolving responsibility for different of 
those dimensions to different non-interacting agents clearly risks folly. 
 This general principle has implications for public policy and social 
problem-solving across a wide range.  I shall illustrate it here by reference to 
bioethical issues relating to health care, at three levels:  individual physicians; 
institutional designers; and policy-makers. 
  
 
 A.  Role-differentiated Individual Responsibilities 
 
In addition to the general duties and responsibilities that each of us has 
merely as a moral agent, most of us also have “special responsibilities” 
toward certain other people and for certain other actions and outcomes.  The 
role-differentiated responsibilities of health-care providers are a case in point. 
 The key thing to notice, in the context of the present discussion, is that 
the patient-provider relationship is a bilateral relationship.  Each patient is 
assigned one or more health-care providers, who have a special responsibility 
for that patient's health in a way that they do not for other people who are 
                                                 
31 Simon 2002a,b. 
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not their patients.  In the words of the oath that the World Medical 
Association's Declaration of Geneva asks physicians to swear:  “The health of 
my patient will be my first consideration."  Or as a philosophical lawyer (who 
also served Reagan's Solicitor General) elaborates:  “Doctors.. owe a duty of 
loyalty to their clients, a loyalty which ... requires taking the medical... 
interests of that client more seriously than the interests of others in similar or 
greater need, more seriously, indeed, than formulas of either efficiency... or 
fairness... would require or even permit."32 
 This strategy of assigning specific individuals responsibility for the 
health-care needs of specific other individuals is clearly a strategy of 
“decomposition” of the sort just discussed.  It involves decomposing the 
problem of caring for the health of people in general into a problem of one 
particular person's taking care of particular patients, one-at-a-time.    
 That would be a good solution, if the problem were itself 
decomposable.  But insofar as there are interactions among the health (and 
hence health-care needs) of different people, such a modular approach is not 
well suited to coping with them.  And we know that that is true.  People catch 
infectious diseases from other people; and the best way to prevent one patient 
from becoming infected is often by preventing others around her from 
becoming infected.  That is what “public health” is all about – and public 
health programmes are, of course, the antithesis of modular one-person-at-a-
time approaches to health care. 
                                                 
32 Fried 1978, p. 176. 
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  Not only are there important interactions among patients on the 
“disease” side of the equation.  So too are there important interactions among 
patients on the “treatment” side.  Some of them are positive.  Economies of 
scale can make the unit cost of treating any given patient's condition a 
decreasing function of the number of other patients afflicted with the same 
condition.    
 Some of the more important interactions are negative, however.  
Insofar as medical resources are scarce relative to the need for them (and they 
virtually always are), one person's treatment comes to some greater or lesser 
extent at the cost of some other person's being treated.  The modular 
approach assigns each health care provider responsibility for zealous 
advocacy of her patients' medical interests – even if at some cost to the 
greater needs of others who happen not to be her patients.  That can easily 
lead to misallocation of scarce medical resources, unless (contrary to fact, 
everywhere in the known world) everyone in need of health care had an 
equally effective advocate whose zeal were strictly proportional to her 
patients' medical needs. 
  
 
 B.   Sector-specific Institutional Responsibilities  
 
An analogous failure due to modularity occurs at the level of intersectoral 
institutional design.  The tasks of government are divided up along 
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functional lines, and responsibility for different functions is assigned to 
different departments.   
 Again, that modular solution would work well were the problems to 
be solved decomposable in form.  But typically they are not.  Population 
health is powerfully affected not only by what happens in Ministries of 
Health but also by policies laid down by other ministries (of Housing, of 
Employment, of Environment – not to mention War).  Each agency is left 
maximizing over its own particular remit, which affects performance under 
others' remits, but in ways that are not its job to take into account.   
 A classic case of suboptimization ensues, as each maximizes on its own 
dimension of responsibility without reference to the cost on dimensions that 
are the responsibilities of others.  The Theory of Second-best teaches us that 
we should generally look at choices in a holistic way, assessing options along 
all the relevant dimensions at once.  By “departmentalizing” policy choice, 
the modular approach to institutional design does the opposite of that.   Each 
department is assigned some dimension (or small set of dimensions) to be its 
own particular responsibility, and it is to assess policies within its portfolio 
under that (those) dimensions.   
 Were the spillovers across departmental remits either rare or only on 
high-profile problems, there might be some hope of resolving them through 
special interdepartmental committees (or, in extremis, at the Cabinet table 
itself).  But there is every reason to think that the spillovers are ubiquitous, 
and that coordination is poor.  Certainly when it comes to regulating health 
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risks,  “coordination... in modern government... has not been pursued in any 
systematic way."33  
 This has grievous effects on public health in a great many ways.  For 
just one example, reflect upon what is now known about the “social 
determinants of health."34  Spending just a little money on good public 
housing can save a lot of money in terms of keeping people out of hospital.  If 
both those items appeared on the same organization's ledger, that 
expenditure would be more than balanced by the money it saved.  But those 
items appear on different departments' ledgers.  In consequence, the health 
costs and benefits of policy in other domains are not fully internalized by 
those other departments with line responsibility for the actions in question.  
And attempts to overcome that by giving regional authorities responsibility 
for a wide range of health and community services, and to reallocate 
resources within that portfolio, have not met with any conspicuous success.35 
 Another aspect of the institutional carve-up of responsibilities is of 
course between countries:  pollution, transmission of infectious diseases, 
consequences of trade and labor market policies of one country on the health 
of citizens in other countries, and so on.36  There are clearly health-related 
spillovers across national borders.  However much cross-border cooperation 
there may be in mounting coordinated responses to them, it is undeniably the 
                                                 
33 In the words of Sunstein (1996, p. 1555) – now Administrator of the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs in the Executive Office of the President of the US who is 
responsible for doing just that. 
34 WHO CSDH 2008. 
35 Certainly not in the case of the Prince Edward Island experiment, under the 1993 Health 
and Community Services Act, anyway (Stoddart et al. 2006). 
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case that dividing responsibility among different jurisdictions leads to a 
certain amount of suboptimization as each inevitably prioritizes the health 
needs of its own citizens over those of others. 
 
 
 C.  One Issue at a Time 
 
Herbert Simon was fond of saying that the human mind is essentially a serial 
processor:  it tends to focus attention on one thing at a time.37  When treating 
patients, physicians would never dream of attending to just “one condition at 
a time," ignoring the way a patient's various conditions and treatments might 
interact.  Yet when making public policy on health, we tend to do precisely 
that. 
 We are familiar with one-thing-at-a-time thinking on health through 
the various “wars” serially waged.  Just think of the March of Dimes against 
polio, the War on Cancer, and so on.38  Such one-thing-at-a-time thinking is 
reflected in public health schemes of "vertical" service delivery in developing 
countries (such as National Immunization Days) that target specific 
interventions in ways not fully integrated into the rest of the health system.39  
One-thing-at-a-time thinking is seen, too, in the way that even complex 
omnibus legislation, like the 2010 US health care reform bill, is almost 
                                                                                                                                           
36 For a sophisticated political-philosophical treatment of the latter issue, see Young (204). 
37 Simon 2002b.   
 31 
invariably discussed in terms of just one lightening-rod feature at a time – 
rotating serially, in that case, between "death squads," abortion and “the 
public option." 
 More generally, time on the legislative calendar is strictly limited.  It is 
conventional wisdom that there is room on the agenda of the UK Parliament 
for only about 20 major pieces of legislation to be enacted in any given year.40  
So limits of parliamentary scheduling as well as public attention also ensure 
that we cannot discuss everything all at once. 
 But if the policy problems are interrelated (and all are, if only in that 
they all compete for scarce budgetary resources), then we risk falling afoul of 
the Theory of Second Best by not doing so.  The modular approach of 
thinking about issues one-at-a-time (or a-few-at-a-time) leads to 
suboptimization, as we choose policy options that are best on the dimensions 
we are focusing on without regard to their impact on other dimensions we 
are not. 
 This occurs, for example, whenever government departments (of 
health or anything else) are told to work within some fixed budget.  They do 
the best they can with the resources they have been given.  But (the Theory of 
Second-best teaches us) they might well have done something completely 
different, had they been allocated either more or less resources.   
                                                                                                                                           
38 Observing how the War on Terror was displacing the War on Drugs, one character on "The 
Wire" is lead to ask, "Is our heart not big enough for two wars?"   
39 Msuya 2003. 
40 Mechelen and Rose 1986. 
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 Just as we fall afoul of the Theory of Second Best when taking the 
budget allocated to health (or anything else) as given, so too do we do so 
whenever taking the institutional allocation of responsibilities as given.  
Redrawing the departmental allocation of responsibilities to make the same 
organization responsible for both health and housing, insofar as those 
importantly interact, would reduce institutionally-induced suboptimization 
that comes from different departments focusing on each in isolation.  
Redrawing the boundaries to make all of sub-Saharan Africa a single 
decision-making unit would reduce institutional barriers to a consolidated 
HIV-AIDS strategy for the region. 
 When discussing the “internalization of externalities," political 
economists often talk about redrawing the boundaries so as to make a single 
unit responsible for regulating all activities that affect one another within 
some policy domain.  Making a single decision-making body responsible for 
an entire watershed – the Rhine, for example – eliminates the risk of some 
upstream jurisdiction doing something that would make economic sense only 
if it could count on passing off the costs onto downstream jurisdictions.  The 
case for broadening jurisdictional responsibilities from within the Theory of 
Second-best reinforces that:  doing what is best for the Rhine valley overall is 
importantly different from doing what is best for the Rhine taken one-stretch-





 D.  Strategies for Overcoming the Errors of Decomposition 
 
When we have erred in trying to decompose problems that are not truly 
decomposible, run into Second-Best style problems in consequence, there are 
broadly speaking two standard ways of solving the problem.  Both involve 
taking a more holistic approach to the problem.  But the one takes a holistic 
approach from the bottom-up, while the other takes a holistic approach from 
the top-down.   
 Both strategies are nicely illustrated in recent public-service reforms in 
the UK.  For am example of the bottom-up approach to getting a more holistic 
perspective, consider the innovation whereby GP-fundholders became 
consolidators with responsibility and resources to provide comprehensively 
for all the medical needs of their patients.  All the interacting factors involved 
in providing good medical care to a patient were thus placed in a single 
person's hands.  For an example of the top-down approach, consider the 
"joined-up government" initiative that tried to coordinate to the multiply 
interacting aspects of public policy at the very center of government.   
 Neither is a wholly satisfactory approach.  The bottom-up approach is 
(or can be if it works well) good for capturing the interactions among policies 
impacting any given person; but it is no good for capturing interactions 
among people.  And, as I have already said, it crucially supposes that each 
person has an equally effective advocate.  The top-down approach is (or can 
be if it works well) good for capturing the interactions among policies within 
a jurisdiction; but it is no good for capturing interactions among jurisdictions. 
 34 
 Each of those standard approaches has merit, in its place.  But 
something more is needed to solve the widest-scale errors of Second-Best 
arising from decomposing problems that are not decomposible.  For that, we 
need to implement something more like the "all-encompassing" approach 
suggested by the "internalizing externalities" story just told.  We need to 
create some authority that is actually responsible for all of the interacting 
elements taken together.  For problems that importantly interact all across the 




V.  Another Partial Solution:  Robustness Against Changing Possibilities 
 
So far I have been using the term “second-best” in a generic way to refer to 
anything that is not first-best.  But of course the same sorts of feasibility 
constraints that force us to fall back on second-best solutions can, if the literal 
second-best is also infeasible, also drive us to third-, fourth- or fifth-best 
solutions. 
 The Theory of Second-best applies all the way down.  Just as the 
second-best solution might be unlike the first-best in every respect, so too the 
third-best will often be unlike the first- or second-best in every respect.  And 
so on for the fourth-best, et seq. 
 Now, suppose feasibility constraints change more quickly than policy 
choices can change.   That is a not-uncommon phenomenon in public policy 
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in general.  Path-dependency and historical lock-in are familiar features.41  
That fact, when combined with the Theory of Second-best, has important 
implications for policy choice. 
 Suppose we have chosen the third-best alternative, because that was 
the best available at the time we had to choose.  But now suppose feasibility 
constraints ease, and the second-best alternative suddenly becomes an option.  
If (per the Theory of Second-best) the second-best alternative is wholly unlike 
the third-best, and if we are locked into a policy fit only for pursuing that 
very different third-best alternative, we will be unable to avail ourselves of 
this new opportunity.  
 Such reflections give rise to a further prescription for policy-making.  
Whenever feasibility constraints are likely to change more quickly than 
policy, the rule ought to be:  choose a policy that is robust against changes in 
feasibility.   Thus, in the example just offered, it might be better to opt for a 
policy to pursue the fourth-best alternative instead of the third-best (which is 
also genuinely available), if that policy would be more amenable to pursuit of 
the second- or even first-best alternatives should they become available.   
 Like all maxims of policy, this one should provide only a pro tanto 
reason for action.  If the fourth-best alternative is very much worse than the 
third-best, or if it seems very unlikely that the second- or first-best 
alternatives will become feasible anytime soon, then this maxim might well 
be overridden.  So the robustness strategy, like all the others, is highly 
                                                 
41 Arthur 1988; 1989.  Pierson 2000 
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sensitive to the empirical facts of the matter, and there is no reason to think it 
will always prove possible or even desirable.  Still, “robustness of policy 
choice against changing feasibility” is a consideration that ought always be 
borne in mind in choosing among “sticky” courses of action. 
 Suppose, for a bioethical example, we are trying to prevent the spread 
of some infectious disease.  The first-best alternative would be for everyone to 
be vaccinated against the disease.  But suppose it is technically infeasible to 
produce enough vaccine to do that.  How then ought we best distribute the 
limited supply of vaccine?    
 Imagine that, upon inspection of the interaction patterns among the 
populations at risk, you notice that they sort themselves into several 
relatively self-contained communities, with only a few people passing 
between them.  (Think for example of how HIV is spread by long-distance 
truckers to remote communities in southern Africa.)  Given that observation, 
one strategy would be to try to create herd immunity within at least some of 
those communities (although only some since – let us suppose – there is not 
enough vaccine to create herd immunity within all such communities).  
Another strategy, aimed more at preventing the spread of the disease from 
one community to others, would be to inoculate everyone who passes 
between communities (which would also – let us suppose – pretty fully 
exhaust supplies of the vaccine).   
 Obviously, once the vaccine has been injected into one person it cannot 
be extracted and re-injected into another.  So once we have implemented one 
or other of these policies, we are “locked in."   The first condition for applying 
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my “robustness” rule thus applies.  The second (quickly changing 
possibilities) might as well.  Suppose for example new transportation 
possibilities suddenly emerge, and lots of new people start plying the trade 
routes between the various communities.    
 Absent robustness considerations, the ranking of policy options would 
seem to be that:  (1)  immunizing everyone at risk is first-best (but ex 
hypothesi infeasible); (2) immunizing travelers between communities is 
second-best, because if successful it promises to protect all communities; (3) 
immunizing enough people to create herd immunity within some 
communities is third-best, because it leaves other whole communities 
unprotected.    
 That is the way things look, without taking robustness considerations 
into account.  Given robustness considerations, however, and the real risk 
that there might suddenly be so many travelers that that strategy collapses, it 
might be better to opt for distributing the vaccine so as to give at least some 




V.  Conclusion 
 
The upshot is a moderately discouraging one.  The trouble that the Theory of 
Second-best makes for policy choice is not easily avoided.  It issues firm 
cautions against the strategy of bringing the real world more into line with 
 38 
the presuppositions of ideal theory, in much the same way and for much the 
same reasons it does against the more standard strategy of adapting ideal 
theory to fit the real world.  The Theory of Second-best furhter warns that 
theorizing in the vicinity of the actual might be highly unstable; that 
problems might not be decomposible; and that there may be no policy choice 
that would be robust against all possible (or even all likely) eventualities.  In 
short, if we are looking for guarantees, there seem to be none.   
 The Theory of Second-best might unsettle any of those strategies.   Or 
it might not.  On the weaker and more general form I have been focusing on 
in this chapter, there is no reason to think it will necessarily always do so.  It 
may turn out that there are some realms in which the second-best really is 
exactly like the first-best in all respects except one.  Whether there are and 
what they might be is an empirical matter, not resolvable by philosophical 
analysis alone.  The most the philosopher can do is to warn policy-makers to 
watch out for interactions across evaluative dimensions and to be sensitive to 
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